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Introduction
Russie suf f er.e tode.y fro:m an unprecedented combination of
economic ails : an industrial depression verse than the .Aln.erican
Great Depression ; ralnpant cri:m.e a?".rl corruption; widespread
une:mploy:ment ; falling producti Yi ty a.'>ld standards of liYing ;
political instability .:

91-..-l

a lack of resolYe to address these

problems _ Of course . o:t1e cf the biggest problem2 Rue~ia faces is

inflation.

Prices rose more in Russia during the first week of 1994
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The primary purpose of this paper is to review the literature
that analyzes Russia·s economic transition and the causes of the
inflation.

Next , the paper analyzes what role the inflation plays

in the current process of reform of the Russian economy.

Finally,

drawing from ti:-.ie experiences of other nations with similar
histories, previous and possible policy options to remedy the
inflation are discussed.
~ussian Inflation History

Nobel Laureate l1ilton Friedlrla.n, the major founder of the
Uonetarist School of thought in Economics , wrote that " 'inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon .. . produced only by a
more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output . "''2
1 "tndicators.,"

t.ummersa,1-n···: February 22., 1994. no author., p. 3.

~Friedman . Milton. "The Counter Revolution in Monetary Theon,1," Occasional Paper No. 33
{London : !EA- 'Ni ncot Foundation) , 19?0, p.24.. ee quoterl in "Economic Stebi112etfon 1r:
the former Soviet Union: Lessons irom Mgenti na and Brazil" by William Moskoif and
M3der Ns2mi, p. 70.

Russia is not exe:pt fro~ this la~ : laBt year , vhile the R1..!3~ian
Central Ban}: pursued an irregularly loose monetary policy _. consU!ller
prices rose at a rate bet,;.;reen ten and thirty percent every m.onth. 3
Tat,le 1 ( XolY!J}!ersE!·_1'Jt ', 1994 ) shows how credit le~,e ls ( roughly

equivalent to monetary aggregates) rose in relation to the
Ruble/ American Dollar excl"..anqe rate .
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Because the Dollar is a relati'ltely stable currency, tr.is graph shows
distinctly hcT"T inflation from loose :monetary policy 1'..as eroded the
value (ergo , purchasing po~er} cf the ruble.

The solution then ,

would 3eem simple: tighten D1onetary policy L"l order to reduce
inflation.

Ho,;,:rever , this is neither a satisfactory answer nor a

complete solution for stabili:!:ation of the Russian economy.
Without a functioning economy, implementing selected and
targeted policies has little effect .

For example, implementing

orthodox monetary policy before stabilizing political and economic
expectations erodes livincr s tandards as well as public confidence in
government..

On ttie other hand , enacting sweeping fiscal reforms

without corresponding monetary discipline is futile : any gains made
in productivity or living standards are absorbed or overtaken by
inflation.
!n order t o fully u-nrlerst.~-nn the inflation in Russia, so that
solutions can be found , it is important to review underly-i.nq
problems of the economy and the reasons why these problems exist .
There are :ma.11y underlying causes of the current inflation in Russia ,
ranging from economic to cultural in origin.

Furthermore , these

problems are often so intrinsically related that it is ;ffipossible to
3epara te them f rem each ether .

E~ten so . it is neceesar1T to isolate

the major ce.t!s e s cf inflaticn in Russia. toda.)" .

T'ne most important cause of the inflation in Russia is the
legacy of the centrally-planned Soviet economy.

It is common to

refer to excess money in a certain type of inflationary economy as
an ·. overhang of money

But, in this case, the ' hangover ' is more

than just a monetary metaptior .

Because the Soviet Union indulged in

unsustainable and irresponsible economic practices for most of its
seventy-four years , Russia must now face not only spiraling
inflation, but hungry citizens, dried-up production, angry

3

pensioners , corruption.. ar..d poli tice.l headaches.
Central planninq severely hinders the Russian economy.
Industrial production in Russia decline~ more than fifty-percent
since 1990.4 Economic, and therefore, fiscal recovery present
substantial challenqes .

Poland, an economy Russia is often compared

to, took nearly a decade to emerge from a central-planninq induced
depression. 5
tlicro-econolllic relationE , inclurlir..g domestic and interrepublican , ha.Ye been seYerely l~ted by the dissolution of the
So~tiet Union 3.!ld the eccr1olllic tr~~i tion.

prcYides the best exrunple :

In this cage an anecdote

Because of the legacy of the old SoYiet

system , cigarette tobacco

rolling papers are produced in

HoweYer . the glue to held the cigarettes together is :m.a..--iufactured m
another republic.

Since the dissolution of the SoYiet Union ,

coordin"9.tinq the resources to collect all three ra~~ :materials became
an impossible task , p~hi:ng up the prices for cigarettes .
Russian agricultural production is down 45 percent since 1990 .6
Food industry productivity is down 35-40 percent . 7

4
" I ii"
· 4 1·VII
. - ()c.
., "r1·s1·
- : H·Ui-·v
n,:. V
"'"l t:;l
• • L.:.·
J.'· -· - · . ~~,::--' ·' ·', .....
..
lll<il.
l.,
. ;i
u::>l , " l\l.illlllltl-'<LII~
I IQ ,.CL
II ••
1 1 I ,-.n
77"'f.
Seasonally adj usted , se':' Graph •4, p. 43.
5 Maita I .. Shlomo and Ben-Zion f-11 l ner .. ··Russ1a and Poland: the Anatomy of Transition _."
Chall enge. September -October. 1993 . pp. 40 - 47.
6 v; r-i"h"'nko :1
u;1 ki'a
ll.., Cr-ioio - '"'"n"' r;;.,,<> I aot " j"°;,n,~r~o,.j ·' ·' M<>r-<'h 1 1 00 4
.. . t ... , et al "I ntlatinn 'V-.
p. 43.
7 "Happiness b not in MooeiJ, C:veo i n its Quantity'· /..'~l mmer.51.int': December 21, i 993, No
author , p. 28.
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Food production is key to the econo:m.y.

Pole..."ld for ex~le , 1res able

to speed the traneition to a !!!arket eco~c~y, in part , becauee
r~gging p:roble:m.s of f cod shortages dictn·· t e~ist .

Russia forcibly

collectiYized its agricultural eyste?l 11r.ner the Soviets and depended

more strongly on agricultural central pla1~~ing the-~ Polanrl.
All of these factors drive inflation by decreasing public
confidence in the functioninq of the economy.

This results in

behavior tr.aat accounts for inflation in advance, continuing the
wage-price spiral.

Food production for example, is critical to

inf la tior.aary pressure .

Since all people in an economy are affected

by inflation of food prices, inefficiency in agriculture translates
eventually into general consUJD.er-price inf lat.ion. :3
Political instability is a.nether of the :me.jcr reason~
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infle.tion is rampant in Russia today.

Political -ir;~tability

produces apathy and neglect on the part cf economic actors in a
society.
reluctance

r-esul ts.

Because of this , i..11cree.sed precautions and unnue
C!l

the p~rt cf i!ldustrialists

a_n~

bueinessperson.s

Peli ti cal instability also results m go...rerll!!ent paralysis

and ir..decisic11 .

Both cf these effects can lead to inflation.

Because economic
to cc~rer risk factors .· econo~ic prcd~ction slo;-rs to s. t-~l t .

Because many industrialists still retain strong ties to the
goverment leaders of the old Soviet Union, cheap credits are often
delll8.nded from. the Central Bank.

Such credits are different from.

norlll8.l currency issues from. a central bank.
subsidized loans to individual industries.

These are direct,
Often they are targeted

toward factories and sectors that em.ploy large numbers of people .
Rather than invest these credits in restntcturinq and renovation,
they are u::sed to furt.t1er fund inefficient production and labor
practices .

-rney also serve as a substitute for :m.oney, continuir.iq

the inflationary spiral.

Although Central Bank Chairman Victor

Gerashchenko has accom.plished a considerable lessening of credit
extension since December 1993 , these subsidized loans continue the
inflation problem. in Russia today.
Bar.king proble:ms .· lack cf enf 01·ceable property la~·ts .·
a1ld bureaucracy are ex~mrles of other factors tr.at continue the
current inflation in Russia.

Furthermore, all cf these factors

contribute to an unbreakable circle:

none of the prcble!IB can be

sol Yed without the others being si:m.ul tanecusly addressed.
6

Hm-reYer ,

no one ha.s the political abili tI" to address all of the proble?ls
concurrently.

There is general disaqreem.ent a.bout the original causes of the
inflation.

On a qovernm.ental level, this paralyzes the process of

establishing fiscal responsibility.

Because of this, outside

agencies, such as the HIF and World Bank, are reluctant to offer
assistance.

Before ana.11~iru;r possible policy solutions, it is

ins true ti ve to review

the origins of the inf la.tion.

Is the inflation nov cost-push or dell.and pull?

One of the :major reason3 inflation in Russia is such a serious
problem. is the fact that aggregate demand exceeded aggreqate supply.
For years , the inefficient Soviet econom.y9 produced an insufficient
quantity of goods to fulfill the needs and wants of the Soviet
people .

That which wa.s produced was sold at regulated prices, or

even rationed out .

Everyone , except those unfortunate enouqh to be

part of the huge prison/labor cam.p system , was paid wges and
benefits, regardless of their productivity.

Therefore, most goods

and services during the Soviet period were illllllediately purchasable ;
inflation was evident only in non-price factors , such as lines,
shortages , and black :markets .
This inequality In2.nifested itself as price inflation only
during the 19.te 1980s a.."l!i early 1990s .

Du.ring this ti.?:le, SoYiet

9While the Russian economt) is not tt,e onl tJ successor to the Soviet economy. the only predecessor
to the Ruesien economy 1e the Soviet economy. Unless other\.'ise steterl, ell further
references in this paper to the Soviet Union wrn therefore assume oni y the Soviet
Economy es it relates to preeent-day Ruseie.
7

leader l1ikbail S. GorbacheY began his econoI:lic reforms , Jr.nm.'n as
Perestroika .

~ong ether actions , Gorbachev brought regulated

prices closer to the actual costs of producing them.

Later, RUEsian

President Boris Yel ' tsi..11 , a.."ld his Prime tli.."lister/ .Advisor , Yegor
Ge,idar .- freed :m.ost prices . 10

~ith larqe a:m.cunts of

8."i1'8.ilable, consumers fln.-t producers drove up prices .

Si:m.ply put ,

Russia ~..as suffered in part : fro~ a Psnqover of rubles . These points
support the hypothesi~

is

inf le. tic:?1

inflation.

In order for an inflationary spiral to exist , cost-push
inflation must follow demand-pull inflation.

Tnere are many

arguments that support a hypothesis that cost-push inflation is a
factor in the Russian economy.
The first argu:m.ent that supports this hypothesis, is that
there is not enough :m.oney left in the econo:m.y to continue de~pull inf le.tion.

Sa~tir.ge ~-rere ~tirtus.111" ~-r iped out in the s~er of

1993 .· ~-rhen the gc"tterr..m.ent issued an edict tba t issued ne,;-r currency,
s.?ld in"t."S.lids.ted old !:lo!lie~.

Th;s edict allowed only seYeral

thousand rubles to be returned in cash , the rest r~tas f creed into

in~ccessible savings accounts .
spend on goods av-.,-i

~·Yi thcut s."tts.ilable cash sa,,..; T1~s to

-"-J · ·-'-·-- ~ de!:lS.r.d-pull
og,y~,.; rr,,co

i!1flation cculd net

continue .

The second , and m.ost powerful argument that the inflation in
10 Brigitte Granville. "Price and Currency Reform in Russia arid in tt.e c:s," Russi&n ,j11d East
Euro~i:,an Fi nf!nc-i:, and Tradi:,. Vol . 29 6 1, p. 6.
8

Rtissie. is not demand-pull inflation, is that prcductivit1r in R1~sia

right now is lo't-r in all sectors of the econo:m.y.

De:m.<11".'1 pull

inflation can really cnly occur ,;rhen the eccnc:m.y is prcdu.c~ geed~
and ser~tices th.at people can purchase ~Ti th their earri ?"gs or excess

....... _.. ___

savings .

...__ ,
'T'haraf nra

cost-push inflation must

some role in the

current inflation .

.Another reason why cost-push inflation may be an underlyinq
cause of inflation, is that the restrictions of the Soviet period
ignored the normal increasing of costs in an economy.

It can be

arqued that this repressed cost-inflation has not yet been fully
recurred .

Tnerefore , industries continue to increase their costs to

meet world price levels .
Continued i..11f la tion has forced inf la ticn.e.ry expects. tic~,
leading to a third kind of inflation : hyperinflation.

~~"hi le the

t raditional {Cagan) definition of hyperinflation -- 5~ inflation

per month -- bas net been reached statisticall1r i...~ Ruesia , the

oc curring.

can be geen in the fact tr.at ,

E1ttidence

fiscal periods

duri?1g the

Yel ·· t s in/Geidar ar1m;nistraticn , infle.tion ccnti..'t).Ued at a le~."el of
...~ .., rner
..
Pe ..r ce~•

mn~th 11

- . v ......... .

Iapacts of Inflation

Inflation ha~ :many perr.;cic~ effect~ on any econc:m.y.
11 See t'iJ,,ili°/11t".;":fifil,

li';..-c-t

.. ........ - v ,

Iss ues fro m fai i and vVi nter months uf i 993. See especiaii y " Econumic
Indicators Cc\'eri r:g T\-.'O Years Df Reform ." December 21, 1993, p. 15, No author.
9

continuous inilation often leads to a decline in output .

"SeYere

inflation encour~ge~ e. diYer~icn cf effort tc~rd speculative, and
airey from productive activity. "12

For evidence of this effect in

Russia, He.ital and tliL~er write :
" The streets of !foscow are lined ".;Ti th lnS.keshif t stalls ,

where everything illlaqina.ble is hawked .
~VQ

~• ~

t.rany of those sta.lls

-v-•-- ,

~t ~urbo;ne fo;c]
fynnt -nf• QkQ-~nnad
otnvao •
L-- ;n
~ -•v ~~v~~

v

-

---

privatizing those stores is painfully slow, so they sit idle

and empty. All o~ter :t!osco,;¥ _. there are huge open l!larkets that

rival any · suk ' ( open marketplace) in the l1iddle East.
·.·. It looks , for ~tll the world, like an explosion of

entrepreneurial activity.
i dea.

Apparently, many Russians get the

Under capi te. li3m. , the~r

~~~te

lee.rned,

} 0U ~ e l"Cur
7

living by selling things other people want -- especially when
there i8 no al terns. ti ~te ~-re.1 to make a li ~ting .
7

u

Another of the effects of inflation is the redistributive
effect of inflation.

Inflation acts as a tax on those who hold

long-term investments , and on those who live on fixed incomes , such
as pensioners .

These effects are readily visible in Russia today ,

although inflationary wage-indexing and COLA·s are increasingly
common.

While these safeguards may protect people in the short-

term, they are extremely inflationary, and, consequently,
ineffective in the medium- and long-terms .

--- __

inflation i~ disrupti~te to normal econc!:llc ...va1Qt...,. ;_. n,...,o ,
a 11d. t o econo:m.i c planning . 13

Without reasonsble knm-;rledge about the

future of p~ices fer ir~ute .- it is ~cseible for m~n°gers tc
output.

Si:m.ilarly, Federal ar..d local govenments , atte:m.pti:nq to

protec t the liYinc standards of their constituencies, capriciously

1~

Campbell R. McConneii and Staniet1 L. Brue. "Economi~: Principles. Probierm. and Policies.
Ele·v·enth Editlcn, n St. Lcuis : McGraw· -,Hill Publishing Company, p.175 .

13 fbi d_,p.175.

10

raise the benefits for the electorate .
Other Experiences vith Inflation

Argent;n~ en~ Brazil have had long battles ~ith inflation.
Neither cou.."'ltry has yet recoYered from their ;,...flationary cycle .
Similar to Russia , their inflation is rooted in an excess of
aggregate de:mf'"'~ .- brought on by generationE cf a co '"''"'"f'~ econo~y.
1

·w hile :many of their attempts e..t heterodox inflation strategies haYe
reduced inflation temporarily, none has been successful in

Similar to Russia, Poland has had inflationary difficulties
during its transition from a collllnB.nd economy.

However, the public

is fortunate, in that the recession associated with restructuring of
the economy occurred under a strict political regime.

Price

increases have been restricted, as have increases in wages .
Although thi3 is a painful approach to economic restructuring, the
· sllock-trierapy ' approach had more success than Russia ' s current
mixed approacll .

While the Rus3ian qovernment has ·not yet achieved success in
its restructuring, . some of the policies that have been illl.plemented
are noteworthy.

The first of these , ironically, is the issuance of

new currency in Russia in the summer of 1993.

While this policy

destabilized the public · s confidence in government , it did serve to
14 Moekoff and Ns2mi .. p. 7.

11

reduce inflation. 15
The second of the government initiatives is internal
convertibility of the ruble .

This action allows for foreign

businesses to excbanqe currency within the borders of Russia .

While

this action does not allow profits to leave the c01.mtry, it does
allow more freedom for foreign investment .

However, there bave been

:many conflicting policies during the last year .

The former

Parliament , in an effort to undermine Ye1 · tsin, limited the freedom
in riow these monies could be converted .
Tight :monetary policy bas been used sev-eral tiID.es in recent
months to lessen inflation.

This is the :m.ost ef f ecti"te , a.~ :m.ost

direct .· method to reign in -: nf la tion.

Hm~ever, tight ID.onetary

policy :makes stanc.ards cf livi."'1q fall in relation to previous
expectatio~..e.

This is a pernicious effect of inflation : once the

cycle begins . it is Yery difficult to stop politically.

In fact .

Yegor Ge.idar lost h;s position as PriID.e llinister largely because he
i~ple~ented the fisc~lly co:r!2er.1ative ~easures necessa~y for tight
monetary policy.
In the DeceJD.ber 1993, the new Russian Constitution passed.
-

tlodeled after the French Fifth Republic, the Constitutions
establishes a legal basis for property rights and laws.

This,

coJD.bined with the general price liberalization and commitment to

15 'vVhile 3tatb tical correlations are not avaiable to conciude thi;:i prembe, A.ummerMnt··
graphe f rc!n the periO!! indicate t!'.at i r:flation e!o\-. erl rluri ng the pericrl. See eepecia!! !J
1

February I, 1994, p. 44, Graph

6

2 . "The Reiationship of Credit Levels and lnfiation."

No author.

12

pri va ti:,,;a tion the Yel · tsin e.~m; 'I"\; stre. tion bas de.m.onstra ted , serve to
encourage productive invest.m.ent , ~'hi.ch makes the economy stronger,
thus reducing inflationary pressures .

Privatization by v-ouchers --

st-.e.res 'giv-en back · to the general public for o"..1nership in fcr.m.erly
gcYer:run.ent property

bas continued since 1992 . 16

A program

continued by Yel' tsin , these v·ouchers e.re freely tre.de.ble on sev-eral
exct-.e.nges in Russia
Possible Policy Options:

The first e.ction the Russian goverr..!ll.ent can te.ke to end
inf le.tion is tc :make the ruble totally e.r..d freely conv-ertible .

!1a.king the ruble convertible allc~s in~est~ent money to freely enter
Russia .

This T..Toul.d spur e.n influx of inv-est.m.ent into Russia .

Continued enforce~ent of property laws in Ru3sia would further thi~
effort .

.Another possible policy to mitigate inflation
restructure the Russian agricultural system.

in Russia is to

The United Nations is

in a qood position to offer technical assistance in this vein.
Because agriculture is the linchpin for consUlller prices, this is
especially important .

Such a policy would help consUlller confidence,

as well .
The Russie.n govern.m.ent shoul.d encourage long-term. g:roT..Tth

production

by givir.q cc~T"tftnies

the trick17 transi ticn to pri '\78. tizs. tion.

-- ...,_

. -_.... ,,_ .

; 1"\l"'Ql"lt; 'U'QO

~

tr,

in

in

There are :m.<~r''l1" pcsi ti ~te

16 Brigitte Granvme. "Price and Currerl(;y Reform in RU3si6 and in the CIS," Russian ond Ea.;t
E1Jrnr•el.! n Fi f!l.!f!i:-';' J:!f!~ Tra,je. VoL 29 .-1, p. 31.
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31.gns that the econol!ly can T.rnr}: _ First, profitable enterprises
exist in RUEsia . 17 1flllle they are rare , · and much of the activity is
speculatiYe , they proYe tr.at opportunities de e:iist .

Second , Russia

can return from. hyperinflation: as a ?1onetary sn<i political
ph encm.enon18 ,

the inflation can be reduced to leYels that reflect

onl17 the structural problem~ in the eccnc~)7 .

Russia is also in a unique position to encourage intra.republic trade.

T"nis is true for both the states of the fonD.er

Soviet Union and for Russia ' s own Federal states . 19 T"nis could
further regional stability and would serve to reunite old producers
and suppliers .

Enviroillll.ental cleanup and oil production are areas

in which these new nations could cooperate profitably.

While a

sinqle currency m.iqht aid in developing this cooperation, it is not
absolutely necessary _2C
Finally, the International tlonetary Fund (Il1F ) should loosen
its requirements for fiscal cc~traints .

ab~n::io~ its role

W1'~le the It!F should not

that fiscal

enforced , shock-therapies of the r..ature that the Il1F ad,.rccs. tes
i?~11erently· politically deste.bili=ing.

17 !bid, p. 45 .

18 Graphs from t ~1mmer.'J/Jnt··· / ~h<Ns j 1JmJ)S 1n exchange rate "when Velts1 n and Gaidar are
po1iticai1 y adive. See espechiil y Nikita Ki richeoko, et al. " Ioftatioo & Crisis: Hope Dies
Last," .t.'ommer.~8.llt-"·: Marc-h 1, 1994. This h also stJpported by Kennl?th H. Bacon "I MF

Clears Rei ease of $ 1.5 Bi ii ion in Aid For Russia to Hei p Rescue Its Economy." Wall Street
.Journal. April 21, 1994, p. A! e.
19 \A/a111·
"h
(t u
•., •.• -rhr1·
• 0+1·
v , f:"'
1v I ._. .,,....,.i
uUU

1
R;+
0 ,'n+arn.,,,,ernmer:+01
Dalati"no
, , " ..
'"" t,la1111ar
i\C'-i"j':f""' ' . "011oo;a
•"- ~
' "' v
' "'v "1v, , ••••• ' "'v fio,-al
,vv~, ,,v
"'' "'.....,. •
· A Ke11
,
~

to
,

Nationai Cohesion ," Cil&iienge . November-uecember , 1993, especia11 y P. 52.
20 Paraphrased from Brigitte GranviHe. "Price and Currency Reform in RUS3ia and in the CIS ,"
P.1Jssh~n and Eas~ Euri:ip,:,':!n fi nan~ and Tr ad,:,. Vol . 29
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29.

Conclusion :

This paper reYie~ed the underly-i_ng problellS with Russia ' s
economy, and how they relate to inflation.

I have concluded that

inflation is now basically cost-push, but I believe that some
evidence re:ma;n~ to s~'J)port the idea that de:mand still pulls
inflation to an extent in Russia .

However, expectations of

inflation play the largest role in continu:Ln.g inflation in Russia
today.

Therefore , I feel that a combination of strict monetary

policy and some heterodox methods should be combined to con~~er
inflation in Russia.

Th-is should be a long-term effort, co!nbined

with continuation of tight monetary policies, a.."ld further economic
and political refor~s.
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